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Abstract. Online political advertisements have become an important
element in electoral campaigning throughout the world. At the same
time, concepts such as misinformation and manipulation have emerged
as a global concern. Although these concepts are distinct from online
political ads and data-driven electoral campaigning, they tend to share a
similar trait related to valence, the intrinsic attractiveness or averseness
of a message. Given this background, the paper examines online political
ads by using a dataset collected from Google’s transparency reports. The
examination is framed to the mid-2019 situation in Europe, including
the European Parliament election in particular. According to the results
based on sentiment analysis of the textual ads displayed via Google’s
advertisement machinery, (i) most of the political ads have expressed
positive sentiments, although these vary greatly between (ii) European
countries as well as across (iii) European political parties. In addition to
these results, the paper contributes to the timely discussion about data-
driven electoral campaigning and its relation to politics and democracy.
Keywords: online ads · political ads · transparency reporting · electoral cam-
paigning · valence · manipulation · political parties · European Parliament
1 Introduction
Political communication is increasingly affect-laden; many politicians use strong
words and seek big emotions for delivering their messages. The delivery, in turn,
is nowadays often done rapidly through social media and micro-targeted online
advertisements. Similar delivery tactics are used to also spread outright misin-
formation and propaganda. There is a similarity between these and the political
online communication of many politicians; both seek to appeal to emotions.
In online marketing emotions are embedded to the concept of valence. Al-
though the origins come from psychology, there is a whole academic branch
devoted to the concept in marketing research. Without delving into the details
of this branch, in essence, products with a positive brand sell. By implication,
it is important for marketers to try to increase positive valence expressed by
customers online. When money is involved, however, anything appearing online
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is subject to manipulation and exploitation. In fact, it has long been known that
the online marketing industry also garners massive gray and black areas, ranging
from shadowy business practices that evade existing consumer protection laws
to downright criminal activities [16]. There is also more to the concept of valence
in online marketing settings. To increase the overall attractiveness of a brand,
marketers often use so-called electronic word-of-mouth techniques; the goal is to
spread a positive sentiment expressed by one customer to other customers [26].
There are also risks involved. For instance, customers may start to also propagate
negative sentiments, leading to negative spillovers through which negative online
chatter about a brand affects negatively the brand’s other product segments as
well as rival brands [2]. In politics such risks amalgamate into strategies; to win
elections, spreading negativity and misinformation may yield a good payoff.
This brief background provides the motivation for the present paper—as well
as its contribution. Although there is a growing literature on online misinforma-
tion, fake news, and related topics [24, 34], the connection of these to online
marketing is seldom explicitly articulated. A further point can be made about
the intermediaries through which misinformation—and marketing material—is
spread. Although Facebook continues to be the platform of choice for commer-
cial marketers, political campaigners, and miscreants alike [3, 7], practically the
whole Web has been captured to serve advertising. However, much of the research
has focused on social media, and, presumably due to the availability of open data,
Twitter. Paid online advertisements have seldom been examined. In fact, this
paper is likely the very first to explore the online political ads displayed through
the advertisement gears of Google, the world’s largest advertisement company.
By following recent research [24], the paper’s focus is further framed to the
mid-2019 situation in Europe, including particularly the 2019 European Par-
liament (EP) election in the European Union (EU). In this regard, it is worth
remarking that the EU’s attempts to combat misinformation and manipulation
can be roughly grouped into two approaches: the General Data Protection Reg-
ulation (GDPR) on one hand and voluntary self-regulation on the other [19].
This dual approach is a little paradoxical; while also Google has released these
voluntary code-of-practice reports for political ads [9], the company is at the
same time under GDPR and other investigations by authorities in the EU and
its member states. A paradox is present also in politics: many European politi-
cians and political parties—including those who campaigned for the GDPR and
who have advocated better privacy regulations in general—have been eager to
market themselves online by using the tools and techniques supplied by the
advertisement industry. Divines do not always practice what they preach.1
In order to present a few sensible and testable hypotheses for the forthcoming
empirical exploration of textual ads displayed through Google, Section 2 con-
tinues the discussion about the relation between online marketing and electoral
campaigning. The dataset and the methods used are elaborated in the subse-
quent Section 3. Results and conclusions follow in Sections 4 and 5, respectively.
1 A Cyclopedia of the Best Thoughts of Charles Dickens, Compiled and Alphabetically
Arranged by F. G. De Fontaine, New York, Hale & Son publishers, 1872. p. 267.
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2 Hypotheses
Data-driven campaigning was one of the keywords in the 2010s politics. Through-
out the decade and throughout the world, politicians and party officials were en-
thusiastically experimenting with new techniques for targeting electorates and
influencing their opinions online [1, 14, 25]. The tools and techniques used were
exactly the same as the ones used for commercial online marketing [4, 5]. How-
ever, things changed dramatically in the late 2010s; the 2016 presidential election
in the United States and the later Cambridge Analytica scandal in 2018 were
the watershed moments for the change. No longer was data-driven campaigning
uncritically seen in positive light by electorates and political establishments. Ma-
nipulation, misinformation, and related concepts entered into the global political
discourse. This entry was nothing unexpected from a computer science perspec-
tive; academic privacy research had pinpointed many of the risks well before these
gained mainstream traction [15]. Later on, social media and technology compa-
nies sought to answer to the public uproar by traditional means of corporate
social responsibility: by producing voluntary transparency reports on political
ads. The reports released by Google supply the data for the present work.
If full corporate social responsibility is taken for granted, these reports cover
most of the political ads shown through the Google’s vast online advertisement
empire. These are paid advertisements for which a record is kept about the ad-
vertisers. Therefore, the paper’s topic covers manipulation but excludes blatant
misinformation, which, at least presently, unlikely occurs extensively through
paid online ads. Yet, there is still a notable parallel between these ads and the
genuine misinformation that is being primarily spread on—or via—social media.
Whether it is plain propaganda, indirect distractions, smear campaigns, pep-
pering of political polarization, or suppressing participation through harassment,
the misinformation tactics used tend to emphasize emotions or valence, the at-
tractiveness or unattractiveness of a political message [3]. The same emphasis
has long been a part of online marketing [6]. Furthermore, valance provides a
clear connection to political science within which negative electoral campaigning
is a classical research topic. Although definitions vary, a directional definition
is often used; these campaigns involve attacks against and confrontation with
competing political actors [30]. Such campaigns have become common also in
Europe through populist parties who seek to appeal to people and their emotions
with criticism about establishments and the exclusion of others [27, 28]. While
populism thus involves both the directional definition and the aspect of valence,
there is also an alternative definition of negative campaigning often cherished by
politicians, campaigners, and consultants: because confrontations belong to pol-
itics, negative campaigning, according to the definition, is more about negative
political messages that involve untruthful or deceptive claims [33]. By loosely fol-
lowing this alternative, non-directional definition, the present work concentrates
on the potential valance-rooted negativity present in online political ads.
Such negativity is neither a fully social nor an entirely political phenomenon;
it contains also visible socio-technical traits. Although the so-called echo cham-
bers would be a good example, the evidence regarding such chambers is mixed [20].
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Therefore, it is more sensible to generally assert that incivility breeds further in-
civility, and online platforms are not neutral actors in this breeding [34]. On the
technical side of this nurturing, a good example would be the 2012 experiment
by Facebook to manipulate users’ news feeds to determine whether emotionally
positive or negative reactions could be invoked algorithmically [5]. Although
such proactive manipulation of masses is beyond the reach of academic research,
related negativity propagation topics have been examined also in marketing [2]
and computer science [23]. Propagation provides a powerful tool also in politics.
On the social and political side, data-driven campaigning has presumably
sought to conduct many similar experiments, as testified by the Cambridge Ana-
lytica scandal. Though, the actual power and control of politicians, campaigners,
and data mining companies may still be somewhat illusory; they are dependent
on the existing online advertisement machinery, which, in turn, is often based on
vague dataset supplied by shady data brokers, questionable machine learning,
and even outright pseudo-science. Furthermore, by nature, politics are always
volatile, non-deterministic, and ambivalent—by implication, it is extremely diffi-
cult to predict which particular topics become the focal topics in a given election.
The 2019 EP election is a good example in this regard: although immigration,
populism, and euroskepticism were all well-anticipated topics [24], the emergence
of climate change as a topic was hardly well-predicted. The results from this Eu-
ropean election also polarized around these topics; populist euroskeptic parties
won, but so did pro-Europe and green parties. Given this background, the first
hypothesis examined in the forthcoming empirical analysis can be stated as:
H1 Reflecting the current political polarization and the particular themes in the
2019 EP election, the online political ads that were shown in Europe around
mid-2019 tended to exhibit negative sentiments and negativity in general.
The literature on negative campaigning allows to refine this Hypothesis H1
into a couple of additional, inferential hypotheses. In particular, it has been
observed that party systems and characteristics of political systems in general
affect negative campaigning and its prevalence [8, 33]. In essence, two-party
systems have often been seen as more prone to negative campaigning than the
multi-party systems and coalition governments that are typical to most European
countries. Therefore, it seems justified to also posit the following hypothesis:
H2 The sentiments—whether positive or negative—expressed in the political on-
line ads around the 2019 EP election varied across the EU member states.
A corollary Hypothesis H3 logically follows:
H3 The sentiments expressed in the mid-2019 European online political ads var-
ied not only across the EU member states but also across political parties.
As party systems vary across Europe, so do parties, contextual factors, cam-
paigning strategies, and political cultures. Besides this truism, Hypothesis H3
can be justified with existing observations that different parties tend to use on-
line campaigning techniques differently [1, 14, 25]. Finally, it should be noted
that neither H2 nor H3 are logically dependent on the answer for Hypothesis H1.
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3 Materials and Methods
3.1 Data
The dataset is based on Google’s [10] transparency reporting on the political
advertising in the European Union. The following seven important points should
be enumerated about the dataset and its pre-processing for obtaining the sample:
1. The EU itself is only used by Google to distinguish the geographic origins
of the authors of the political ads. By implication, the data does not sepa-
rate advertisements exclusively about the EU and its elections—nor does it
distinguish advertisements potentially placed by the EU and its institutions.
However, information is available about elections targeted by an advertiser.
Given this information, the sampling of observations was restricted to those
advertisers who had announced having advertised in the 2019 EP election.
2. Only textual advertisements were included in the sample. As can be seen
from Fig. 1, most of the political ads placed through Google were in fact
videos and images. The textual advertisements are those typically seen as
so-called paid banners in the company’s search engine results, while the the
political video advertisements typically appear in YouTube, and so forth.
3. All textual advertisements in the sample were further translated to English
by using Google’s online translation engine. By and large, this automatic
translation is necessary because contemporary text mining frameworks re-
main limited in their coverage of the multiple languages spoken in Europe.
4. Duplicate textual advertisements were excluded. This exclusion was done
with simple string matching before and after the translation: if two ads
contained the exact same text, only one of these was included in the sample.
5. Given the lexicon-based sentiment analysis techniques soon described, only
minimal pre-processing was applied to the translated ads. Namely: the strings
“no.”, “No.”, and “NO.” were excluded because the sentiment techniques
tend to equate these to negations, although in the present context these
refer to campaigning with a candidate’s number in a particular election.
6. No data was available for some advertisements due to third-party hosting of
the advertisements and violations of Google’s policies [9] for political ads.
Given the ongoing debate about online political ads in general, the quite
a few policy violations are particularly interesting, but, unfortunately, no
details are provided by Google regarding the reasons behind these violations.
7. The data is very limited and coarse with respect to targeting and profiling [4].
The last point requires a brief further comment. Although hosting and tech-
nical traceability have recently been under regulatory scrutiny [11], the micro-
targeting, mass-profiling, and manipulation aspects have received most of the
general political attention [4, 5, 7]. In this respect, Google seems to have aligned
itself more toward Facebook than toward Twitter and Spotify, both of which
have banned all political ads in their platforms. In fact, a spokesperson from
5
All political ads
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Further
processing
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Fig. 1: The Construction of the Sample
Google recently assured that the company has “never offered granular micro-
targeting of election ads”, but, nevertheless, since the beginning of 2020, it now
only allows targeting of political advertisements according to age, gender, and
postal code [31]. Some data about age and gender targeting is also available in
the transparency reports. In theory, this data could be useful for continuing the
work on Google’s demographic profiling [32], but, in practice, the data is of little
practical use. For instance: from all advertisement campaigns in the raw dataset
(n = 46, 880), which group multiple ads, about 80% have not specified gender-
based targeting. The second largest group (18%) is something labeled as “male,
female, unknown gender”, which, more than anything, foretells about (perhaps
intentional) construct validity problems affecting the transparency reporting.
An additional point should be made about the longitudinal scope of the sam-
ple. The sample covers a period of about five months. The earliest and latest
advertisements in the dataset are from 20 May 2019 and 6 October 2019, respec-
tively. The starting date is constrained by data availability; in general, Google
does not provide earlier data. The ending date, in turn, is framed with the date of
obtaining the raw dataset (9 October 2019). Given the varying lengths of elec-
toral campaigns, the 2019 European Parliament election (23–26 May) is thus
only partially covered. Even though the coverage captures only the few late days
in the campaigning for the EP election, it seems fair to assume that these were
also the dates of particularly intense campaigning. The point is important espe-
cially in the online context, which does not require lengthy upfront planning. In
other words, online political ads are easy to place even for last-minute probes.
However, even with the noted restriction of the sample to those advertisers
who had advertised in the EP election, also other elections and referendums
are potentially covered because these advertisers may have advertised also in
other occasions. Given the longitudinal scope, these occasions include: the Irish
referendum on divorce (24 May) and the Romanian referendum on corruption
(26 May), the federal election in Belgium (26 May), the second round in the
Lithuanian presidential election (26 May), the Danish and Greek parliamentary
elections (5 June and 7 July, respectively), the lower house election in Austria (29
September), and the Portuguese parliamentary election (6 October). In addition,
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the Brexit saga is visible also in the sample analyzed. Furthermore, politicians,
party officials, interest groups, and individuals may also place online ads for
general advocacy and publicity reasons without a clear electoral target [7]. All
this said, qualitative observations and a few keyword-based searches indicate that
many of the ads sampled explicitly or implicitly refer to the 2019 EP election.
3.2 Methods
Sentiment analysis refers to a group of computational methods to identify subjec-
tive information and affective states. In the text mining context these methods
can be roughly grouped into machine learning and lexicon-based approaches.
Two simple lexicon-based methods are used in the present work: the algorithms
of Liu et al. [17] and Nielsen [21], as implemented in an R package [13]. Both rank
the sentiment of a document according to the number of times manually labeled
negative and positive words appear in the document. In addition, the slightly
more sophisticated method of Hutto and Gilbert [12] is used, as implemented in
a Python package [22]. This method augments the lexicon-based approach with
a few (deterministic) rules on the grammar and style used in a document. All
three methods are tailored for text mining of social media data. Therefore, the
methods seem also suitable for analyzing the textual political advertisements
delivered through Google. Akin to messages in Twitter, these ads are short and
up to a point; the mean character count of the sample is only 118 characters.
Given the sentiment polarity scores computed, regression analysis is used for
examining Hypotheses H2 and H3. To this end, four regression models are fitted:
1. The baseline model contains the control variables enumerated in Table 1.
2. The second model includes the control variables and a set of 25 dummy
variables recording the European countries in which a given ad was displayed.
Because some ads are displayed in multiple countries, it should be noted that
these variables are not so-called fixed effects; all countries are included.
3. The third model contains the control variables and a set of 62 dummy vari-
ables for advertisers identified as political parties. These are fixed effects; the
reference is the largest group of other, unidentified, advertisers. The country
dummy variables cannot be included in this model due to multicollinearity.
4. The last model in constructed like the third one; the party dummy variables
are replaced with 158 dummy variables for the unique individual advertisers.
A further point should be made about the identification of political parties.
This identification was done manually. For unclear cases, open source intelligence
(a.k.a. Google and Wikipedia) was used to check whether the name of an ad-
vertiser referred to an European political party. On the one hand, the mapping
includes cases whereby a local or a regional chapter of a clearly identifiable party
had placed the given political ad; on the other, electoral alliances had to be ex-
cluded from the identification. Although about 72% of all political ads could be
mapped to parties, it should be emphasized that many of the political ads were
7
Table 1: Control Variables
Mnemonic Description
DAYS A continuous variable measuring the number of days an ad was shown.
IMPR Three dummy variables for the number of Google-defined “impressions”
an ad got; the reference variable is less than ten thousand impressions.
EURO Three dummy variables for the upper bound of the cost of an ad; the
reference variable is 50e (the maximum dummy variable denotes 60, 000e).
AGET A dummy variable that takes the value one in case any of the campaigns
to which an ad belonged had specified any kind of age-based targeting.
GENT Defined analogously to AGET, but for gender-based targeting.
MULT A dummy variable scoring 1 if an ad was displayed in multiple countries.
placed by different support associations, marketing companies, and even individ-
uals on behalf of some particular politicians and candidates. National election
laws also differ between the EU member states with respect to the general rules
on electoral campaigning. Currently, only eleven member states have specific leg-
islations in place regarding mandatory transparency of online political ads [19].
Needless to say, these judicial aspects are an important element in the debate
about political online ads—and the sample also contains some cases in which a
vague support association in one country had advertised in another country.
4 Results
All three sentiment algorithms indicate pronouncedly non-negative valence. De-
pending on an algorithm, neutral (zero-valued) sentiments account for about
33–46% of all political ads sampled. As can be seen from Fig. 2, only less than
10% of the ads have a negative sentiment polarity according to the algorithms.
However, there is a notable variation across the countries in which the polit-
ical ads were shown. As can be concluded from the numbers shown on the right
in Fig. 3, also the number of ads placed vary greatly across the twenty-five coun-
tries in the sample. Although the largest amount of ads was shown in Germany,
Belgium, Poland, Finland, and Denmark, respectively, closely followed. This is
a noteworthy observation as such; a country’s size does not seem to predict well
the amount of online Google ads placed by campaigners. This observation also
corners certain national debates about online political advertisement in general.
Take Finland as an example: there is an ongoing political rhetoric seeking to
claim that Finnish political parties seldom have placed ads through media such
as Google and Twitter—yet the results presented clearly indicate otherwise.
Although the mean sentiment polarity remains positive in all countries, the
range of the values is substantial. Regarding the largest member states, for
instance, positive sentiments were much more common in France compared
to Germany—and, hardly surprisingly, the United Kingdom. The explanation
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Fig. 2: Sentiment Polarity According to Three Algorithms
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Fig. 4: Sentiment Polarity According Political Parties
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largely traces to the particular EP election themes and the national styles of po-
litical communication used in the online advertisements placed through Google.
For instance, one German ad started with an indirect rhetorical question
about “whether nationalists, right-wing populists and right-wing radicals destroy
Europe”, and continued with an indirect answer: “or whether Europe remains a
place of freedom, peace and cohesion”. Another ad likewise ended to a slogan:
“for courage, cohesion and humanity instead of fear, hatred and exclusion”. Both
are good examples about a political advertisement style through which negative
and positive sentiments balance each other out. A further explanation relates
to the climate change that was a pronounced theme particularly in Germany.
This theme was accompanied with many ads using contentious words with a
negative tone, such as crisis, fight, suffer, failure, or “a healthy agriculture with-
out poison and animal cruelty”. Rather similar national explanations apply to
Poland and Croatia, the two countries with the lowest average sentiment po-
larity scores. With respect to Poland, the explanation has nothing to do with
euroskepticism; instead, there were a few particular candidates who campaigned
online with slogans such as “more illegal dumps and smog over Silesia”, ”scandal
needs clarification”, “fight low emissions”, and so forth. Such slogans reflect the
online campaigning strategies of Partia Zieloni, the Green Party [25]. In Croa-
tia, the four ads seem to relate to campaigning with corruption and fiscal reform
themes; “citizens damaged by illegal banking operations”—a cut excerpt from an
ad placed by the populist POWER – People’s and Civic Engagement Party. This
party is also visible in Fig. 4, which shows the scores across all parties identified.
Again a substantial variation exists both in terms of the ads placed and the
sentiments expressed by the manually identified political parties. However, it is
difficult to say anything specific about the potential explanations behind this
variation. For instance, many of the euroskeptic parties—including Alternative
fu¨r Deutschland (Germany), Dansk Folkeparti (Denmark), Sloboda a Solidarita
(Slovakia), or Fratelli d’Italia and Salvini’s Lega in Italy—rank clearly below
the average sentiment polarity scores. While this observation is expected, some
other euroskeptic parties, such as Freiheitliche Partei O¨sterreich (Austria) and
Svobodn (Czech Republic), have placed ads with clearly positive sentiments. On
average, these ads even expressed more positive sentiments than those seen in
the ads of Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen (the green party in Germany), for instance.
Turning to the regression analysis, the four models discussed in Subsection 3.2
were fitted with ordinary least squares (OLS) and logistic regression (LR) sep-
arately for each of the three sentiment detection algorithms. Regarding LR, the
values predicted are probabilities for positive sentiments. The results can be
summarized in the form of Fig. 5. The upper two plots in the figure show the
adjusted coefficients of determination (adj. R2) for the OLS models and the Mc-
Fadden’s [18] pseudo-R2 values for the LR models. The two lower plots display
the Schwarz’s [29] Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) values for the models.
The results can be briefly disseminated with five observations. Firstly: al-
though direct comparability should be approached with caution, the overall per-
formance is roughly similar across the two regression estimators as well as across
11
0.8 1.3 1.4
8.8 8.6 9.9
12.4 14.1 14.8
26.6 31.5 31.7
Liu
 et
 al
.
(20
05
)
Ni
els
en
(20
11
)
Hu
tto
 an
d
Gi
lbe
rt
(20
14
)
Mo
de
l 4
.
Mo
de
l 3
.
Mo
de
l 2
.
Mo
de
l 1
.
0.0
3.9
7.8
11.7
15.6
19.4
23.3
27.2
31.1
35.0
Adjusted R2 × 100 (OLS)
0.6 1.0 1.0
6.8 6.7 7.7
10.4 11.7 12.3
23.3 27.0 27.2
Liu
 et
 al
.
(20
05
)
Ni
els
en
(20
11
)
Hu
tto
 an
d
Gi
lbe
rt
(20
14
)
Mo
de
l 4
.
Mo
de
l 3
.
Mo
de
l 2
.
Mo
de
l 1
.
0.0
3.3
6.7
10.0
13.3
16.7
20.0
23.3
26.7
30.0
McFadden R2 × 100 (LR)
2662 2660 2619
2698 2710 2645
2889 2861 2807
3298 3183 3139
Liu
 et
 al
.
(20
05
)
Ni
els
en
(20
11
)
Hu
tto
 an
d
Gi
lbe
rt
(20
14
)
Mo
de
l 4
.
Mo
de
l 3
.
Mo
de
l 2
.
Mo
de
l 1
.
2600
2678
2756
2833
2911
2989
3067
3144
3222
3300
        BIC (OLS)
2537 2534 2495
2570 2581 2520
2744 2719 2669
3153 3066 3033
Liu
 et
 al
.
(20
05
)
Ni
els
en
(20
11
)
Hu
tto
 an
d
Gi
lbe
rt
(20
14
)
Mo
de
l 4
.
Mo
de
l 3
.
Mo
de
l 2
.
Mo
de
l 1
.
2400
2489
2578
2667
2756
2844
2933
3022
3111
3200
           BIC (LR)
Fig. 5: Regression Performance
the three sentiment algorithms. Secondly: the control variables in Table 1 do not
provide much statistical explanatory power. According to the OLS estimates,
only less than 1.5% of the total variation is explained by the first baseline model.
Though, some of the control variables (notably, MULT) remain statistically sig-
nificant in the more encompassing models. In any case, thirdly, the performance
increases by the inclusion of the country dummy variables (Model 2.) Fourthly,
clear improvements are brought for the R2 values by the party dummy vari-
ables (Model 3.), although these also increase the BIC values, which penalize
the number of parameters more heavily than the R2 and pseudo-R2 statistics.
Lastly, even larger increases are seen in the BIC values when the party dummy
variables are replaced by the variables for the unique identifiers of the individual
advertisers (Model 4). Although the first model yields the smallest BICs in all
regressions, it seems fair to prefer the parsimonious second or third model; the
fourth model is likely prone to overfitting. Thus, all in all, Hypothesis H1 can
be rejected, but the two subsequent Hypotheses H2 and H3 remain in force.
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5 Conclusion
This exploratory paper examined the timely topic of online political advertise-
ments. By using a dataset of textual ads displayed through Google’s online adver-
tisement machinery and focusing on the mid-2019 situation in Europe, including
the European Parliament election in particular, three hypotheses were presented
for the exploration with sentiment analysis. The first one (H1) was framed with
negativity—a distinct trait of negative electoral campaigning as well as a factor
in valence-based online marketing in general. This hypothesis is not supported
by the dataset: most of the online political ads shown in Europe have exhib-
ited neutral or positive sentiments. Although the simple regression estimation
strategy conducted does not allow to explicitly compare Hypothesis H2 against
Hypothesis H3, it seems sensible to further conclude that while there exists vari-
ation across the European countries observed (H2), further variation is present
with respect to individual advertisers, whether political parties and their local or
regional chapters (H3), associations, online marketing companies, or individuals.
Although H1 was rejected and neutral sentiments have been common, all
three algorithms used still indicate a substantive amount of positive sentiments
in the textual political ads. This observation can be used to argue that valence-
based campaigning is widely practiced. Like with online marketing, such cam-
paigning is partially explained by the technical constraints imposed by the online
advertising platforms. Short taglines with catchy sentimental words—whether
positive or negative—are also what the platforms are imposing upon campaign-
ers and political advertisers. As a consequence, the room for argumentation,
discussion, debate, and “evidence-based politics” arguably shrinks even further.
A final point can be made about regulation. In the EU elections are regulated
by national laws, and there are no cues that the EU would be willing to intervene.
At the same time, according to a recent voluntary transparency report [9], Google
detected as many as 16, 690 EU-based accounts that violated the company’s
misrepresentation policies between the first of May 2019 and 26 May 2019. The
sample examined aligns with this number; about 12% of the EP-related textual
ads were unavailable either due to policy violations or due to third-party hosting.
These numbers generally hint that also Google has a problem with its self-
regulation of political ads. And divines do not always practice what they preach.
Acknowledgements
This research was supported by the Academy of Finland.
References
[1] Anstead, N.: Data-Driven Campaigning in the 2015 United Kingdom General
Election. The International Journal of Press/Politics 22(3), 294–313 (2017)
[2] Borah, A., Tellis, G.J.: Halo (Spillover) Effects in Social Media: Do Product Re-
calls of One Brand Hurt or Help Rival Brands? Journal of Marketing Research
53(2), 143–160 (2016)
13
[3] Bradshaw, S., Howard, P.N.: The Global Disinformation Order: 2019 Global In-
ventory of Organised Social Media Manipulation (2019), Working Paper 2019.3,
Computational Propaganda Research Project, Oxford Internet Institute, Univer-
sity of Oxford. Available online in January 2020: https://comprop.oii.ox.ac.
uk/wp-content/uploads/sites/93/2019/09/CyberTroop-Report19.pdf
[4] Chester, J., Montgomery, K.C.: The Digital Commercialisation of US Politics –
2020 and Beyond. Internet Policy Review 8(4), 1–23 (2019)
[5] Christl, W.: How Companies Use Personal Data Against People: Automated Dis-
advantage, Personalized Persuasion, and the Societal Ramifications of the Com-
mercial Use of Personal Information (2017), Working Paper by Cracked Labs,
available online in January 2020: https://crackedlabs.org/dl/CrackedLabs_
Christl_DataAgainstPeople.pdf
[6] Colicev, A., Kumar, A., O’Connor, P.: Modeling the Relationship Between Firm
and User Generated Content and the Stages of the Marketing Funnel. Interna-
tional Journal of Research in Marketing 36(1), 100–116 (2019)
[7] Dommett, K., Power, S.: The Political Economy of Facebook Advertising: Election
Spending, Regulation and Targeting Online. The Political Quarterly 90(2), 257–
265 (2019)
[8] Elmelund-Præstekær, C., Svensson, H.M.: Ebbs and Flows of Negative Campaign-
ing: A Longitudinal Study of the Influence of Contextual Factors on Danish Cam-
paign Rhetoric. European Journal of Communication 29(2), 230–239 (2013)
[9] Google, Inc.: EC Action Plan on Disinformation: Google May 2019 Report
(2019), Available online in January 2020: https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/
document.cfm?doc_id=60042
[10] Google, Inc.: Political Advertising in the European Union (2019), Data retrieved in
9 October 2019 from https://storage.googleapis.com/transparencyreport/
google-political-ads-transparency-bundle.zip
[11] Haenschen, K., Wolf, J.: Disclaiming Responsibility: How Platforms Deadlocked
the Federal Election Commission’s Efforts to Regulate Digital Political Advertis-
ing. Telecommunications Policy 43(8), 101824 (2019)
[12] Hutto, C.J., Gilbert, E.: VADER: A Parsimonious Rule-Based Model for Senti-
ment Analysis of Social Media Text. In: Proceedings of the Eighth International
AAAI Conference on Weblogs and Social Media. pp. 216–225. AAAI, Ann Arbor
(2014)
[13] Jockers, M.L.: Syuzhet: Extract Sentiment and Plot Arcs from Text (2015), R
package version 1.0.4
[14] Jungherr, A.: Four Functions of Digital Tools in Election Campaigns: The Ger-
man Case. The International Journal of Press/Politics 21(3), 358–377 (2016)
[15] Korolova, A.: Privacy Violations Using Microtargeted Ads: A Case Study. In:
Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Data Mining Workshops
(ICDMW 2010). pp. 474–482. IEEE, Sydney (2010)
[16] Kshetri, N.: The Economics of Click Fraud. IEEE Security & Privacy 8(3), 45–53
(2010)
[17] Liu, B., Hu, M., Cheng, J.: Opinion Observer: Analyzing and Comparing Opinions
on the Web. In: Proceedings of the 14th International Conference on World Wide
Web (WWW 2005). pp. 342–351. ACM, Chiba (2005)
[18] McFadden, D.: Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In:
Zarembka, P. (ed.) Frontiers in Econometrics, pp. 105–142. Academic Press, New
York (1974)
[19] Nenadic´, I.: Unpacking the “European Approach to Tackling Challenges of Disin-
formation and Political Manipulation. Internet Policy Review 8(4), 1–22 (2019)
14
[20] Nguyen, A., Vu, H.T.: Testing Popular News Discourse on the “Echo Chamber”
Effect: Does Political Polarisation Occur Among Those Relying on Social Media
as Their Primary Politics News Source? First Monday 24(6) (2019)
[21] A˚rup Nielsen, F.: A New ANEW: Evaluation of a Word List for Sentiment Anal-
ysis in Microblogs (2011), Archived manuscript, available online in January 2020:
https://arxiv.org/abs/1103.2903
[22] The Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK): Version 3.4.5 (2019), available online in
January 2020: http://www.nltk.org
[23] Ozer, M., Yildirim, M., Davulcu, H.: Negative Link Prediction and Its Applica-
tions in Online Political Networks. In: Proceedings of the 28th ACM Conference
on Hypertext and Social Media (HT 2017). pp. 125–134. ACM, Prague (2017)
[24] Pierri, F., Artoni, A., Ceri, S.: Investigating Italian Disinformation Spreading on
Twitter in the Context of 2019 European Elections. PLOS ONE 15(1), e0227821
(2020)
[25] Rafa lowski, W.: Parties’ Issue Emphasis Strategies on Facebook. East European
Politics and Societies 34(1), 96–123 (2019)
[26] Ruohonen, J., Hyrynsalmi, S.: Evaluating the Use of Internet Search Volumes for
Time Series Modeling of Sales in the Video Game Industry. Electronic Markets
27(4), 351–370 (2017)
[27] Sakki, I., Hakoko¨nga¨s, E., Pettersson, K.: Past and Present Nationalist Political
Rhetoric in Finland: Changes and Continuities. Journal of Language and Social
Psychology 37(2), 160–180 (2017)
[28] Schmidt, F.: Drivers of Populism: A Four-Country Comparison of Party Com-
munication in the Run-up to the 2014 European Parliament Elections. Political
Studies 66(2), 459–479 (2017)
[29] Schwarz, G.: Estimating the Dimension of a Model. The Annals of Statistics 6(2),
461–464 (1978)
[30] Song, H., Nyhuis, D., Boomgaarden, H.: A Network Model of Negative Campaign-
ing: The Structure and Determinants of Negative Campaigning in Multiparty
Systems. Communication Research 46(2), 273–294 (2019)
[31] Spencer, S.: An Update on our Political Ads Policy (2019), Google
Blog, available online in December: https://blog.google/technology/ads/
update-our-political-ads-policy
[32] Tschantz, M.C., Egelman, S., Choi, J., Weaver, N., Friedland, G.: The Accuracy
of the Demographic Inferences Shown on Google’s Ad Settings. In: Proceedings of
the 17th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society (WPES 2018). pp. 33–41.
ACM, Toronto (2018)
[33] Walter, A.S.: Negative Campaigning in Western Europe: Similar or Different?
Political Studies 62(S1), 42–60 (2014)
[34] Wright, J.: ‘Many People Are Saying...’: Applying the Lessons of Na¨ıve Skepticism
to the Fight against Fake News and Other ‘Total Bullshit’. Postdigital Science
and Education 2, 113–131 (2020)
15
